Welcome to Tactical Gamer

  • Targeted Killing: When pragmatism and international law collide

    "Killing a man is murder unless you do it to the sound of trumpets." ~ Voltaire

    The sources, methods, goals and tactics of identifying legitimate targets for covert action, are matters typically hidden from public scrutiny, yet clearly worthy of public attention and philosophical debate. The following of unequivocal ethical criteria when identifying targets is necessary to minimize blowback when conducting Targeted Killing Operations. Comparable to torture and rendition, the debate that encompasses these operations have passionate supporters on both sides of the issue. In spite of the genuine controversy surrounding this subject, a carefully circumscribed policy of targeted killing can be a legal and effective tool in a counter-terror campaign.

    It is necessary to provide a coherent and acceptable definition of both assassination and targeted killing in order to form a common frame of reference when debating the pertinent moral and legal arguments for and against targeted killing. First, we must differentiate the current US policy of targeted killing from the common understanding of “assassination.” In asymmetric warfare determining combatant vs. non-combatant status is a critical task to any operation. Discerning between these two designations may initially seem effortless, however, in an asymmetric environment these distinctions only come in shades of grey. Throughout the paper, we will examine the arguments for and against targeted killing. Subsequently, I propose policy guidelines to that must be considered in order to minimize blowback when conducting Targeted Killing Operations.

    Establishing a difference between assassination and targeted killing is paramount in developing ethical criteria for Targeted Killing Operations. International Law does not address the term assassination. The word assassination does not appear in the United Nations Charter, Hague or Geneva Conventions, or the Statute of the International Criminal Court. However, Executive Order 12333 is the most recent in a series of three executive orders to have included U.S. Presidential bans on assassination. The purpose of EO 12333 was to preempt more restrictive congressional legislation, preclude individual agents or agencies from taking unilateral actions against selected foreign officials, and to unequivocally affirm that the United Sates does not condone assassination as an instrument of nation policy. “Defining what is not assassination is as important as defining what is assassination.” Assassination is considered illegal regardless of the circumstances. The difference between a targeted killing and a wartime assassination is really a question of method. A wartime assassination disregards jus in bello by utilizing treacherous and perfidious techniques to eliminate the target where a targeted killing does not.

    Many scholars categorize assassination as a subset of murder8 where the target is chosen based on his identity, prominence, public position and the killing motivated to achieve some political objective. This definition lays out three required elements to qualify as an assassination: (1) murder, (2) a specific individual, (3) for political purposes. Therefore, in order for an assassination to take place there must be a politically motivated murder of a specific individual in peacetime.

    The widely accepted definition of targeted killing is “the intentional slaying of a specific individual or group of individuals undertaken with explicit government approval.” This definition however does not establish a legal justification. To go one step further we must distinguish between a legal and illegal government approved slaying in the context of a targeted killing. Two models have been presented to deal with international terrorism, the law enforcement model, as reflected in standards of international human rights law and the armed conflict model, as understood by the international humanitarian law. The law enforcement model inherently assumes terrorist are non-combatants therefore, limiting actions to apprehension making targeted killing illegal. This illegal slaying, (which does not fully meet the above criteria of assassination as it lacks political aspirations) should be considered an extra-judicial execution. The armed conflict model identifies targets as combatants in order to justify lethal action. Hence, the term targeted killing would be appropriate when using the armed conflict model to identify combatants. For this paper, targeted killing will be used to define a legal lethal action as long as it satisfies the requirement of armed conflict and combatant classification.

    The crux of the debate whether targeted killing is legal and subsequently morally just is based on the classification of the subjects being targeted for killing. In conventional war, the distinction between combatants and non-combatants turns on the simple notion of bearing arms, wearing uniforms, belonging to a military organization, and abiding by the rules of war. These conditions; found in Article 4 of the Geneva Convention (1949) are what is used to define a combatant. In 1977 Protocol I to the Geneva Convention made allowances for guerrilla organizations to shed their uniforms when they fight an army of occupation.

    Members of the Al Qaeda organization do not fit the definition of resistance fighter or volunteer militia as set forth in Article 4 of the Geneva Convention. According to Patricia Zengel, Military Law Review, they do not wear uniforms, are not led by a commander that takes responsibility for their actions, and do not follow the laws and customs of war; three of the four requirements needed to be considered a lawful combatant. However, it seems that international terrorists should be considered some sort of combatant. They have not limited themselves to solely seek out and destroy only civilian targets. “It appears then”, as Gross states, “that international terrorists warrant some status that combines criminality with combatancy. This is the proper understanding of unlawful combatant.” Differentiating these key terms allows us to clearly examine the legality and pragmatic positions for targeted killing.

    Arguments for and against Targeted Killing:
    Mary Ellen O‟Connell, of the School of Law at Notre Dame, is a key proponent of the law enforcement model. “Terrorist attacks are criminal acts, not an armed attack. They have all the hallmarks of crime; they are Sporadic and are rarely the responsibility of the state where the perpetrators are located.” This statement is based on Article 2 (4) of the UN charter, stating the premise that terrorist organizations are criminal in origin and they should not be considered combatants. Unfortunately, there is no law enforcement agency today capable of dealing with an international terrorist organization like al-Qaeda. Therefore, the only model that has any chance of success is the armed conflict model. By definition then, using this model infers active members of al-Qaeda to be combatants and may be lawfully targeted at will.

    What is the alternative to the armed conflict model when suspected terrorists are in a foreign country and that nation is either unwilling or incapable of capturing these suspected terrorists? In “Targeted Killing” Daniel Statman claims that the United States is entitled to classify operations against al-Qaeda as war.

    with the loosening of various moral prohibitions implied by such definition, rather than a police-enforcement action aimed at bringing a group of criminals to justice based upon two specific criteria: (a) the gravity of the threat posed by al-Qaeda and (b) the impracticality of coping with this threat by conventional law enforcing institutions and methods.

    It is best to understand targeted killing as an adaption of the guerilla war convention that permits soldiers to identify and subsequently kill one another in the absence of uniforms. Can a government just use lists of names to identify their enemy? In this case, names on a list serve the same function as a uniform: they determine affiliation. The obvious problem is who decides whose name is on the list? This is where transparent and ethically sound criteria must be followed to ensure mistakes are minimalized.

    In the past, states attempted to uphold the principle that states deal only with other states. To do otherwise would confer power and legitimacy to non-state actors and organizations such as al-Qaeda. The precedence set on September 11th, by these international terrorist demonstrate that the U.S. can no longer treat terrorism as a legal matter to „depoliticize‟ and „delegitimize‟ it by defining it as criminal activity instead of warfare due to the magnitude of destructive capabilities these terrorist organizations have evinced in recent history.

    Through the early 1990s the U.S. attempted to apply the law enforcement model against terrorists, bringing to trial those accused of perpetrating the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. This model at best seems to only get the „foot soldiers‟ not the leaders of these international terrorist organizations. Since the adoption of the armed conflict model as doctrine the U.S. is under no obligation to attempt to arrest an individual before targeting him or her. Under this model, the combatant status remains in effect for the duration of the armed conflict unless the individual takes some action to renounce this status. However, considering the importance of intelligence it does not make sense to kill the target when capture and interrogation would produce significant benefits. This opportunity of intelligence demands support of a policy guideline to ensure targeted killing is used as a method of last resort.

    Another argument against targeted killing is to demonstrate a lack of efficacy. Targeted Killing Operations must be supported by a robust intelligence apparatus. Copious amounts of reliable intelligence are necessary to sustain an effective targeted killing program. However, any failure in this process has wide spread blowback potential. The opposition to targeted killings increases dramatically when targeting errors occur and innocent non-combatants are killed. According to the opposition, targeted killing provokes a fierce reaction against both collaborators and those who recruit them and, at the same time, rend the moral and social fabric of the community by introducing an element of distrust among the population.

    Every time a wanted individual was captured, wounded, or killed, the public immediately suspected the work of an informer. It was the beginning of a vicious cycle in which they wanted individuals were hunted by the security forces, while the suspected collaborators were hunted by the wanted, who held them responsible for the death or capture of their comrades.

    Targeted killing may deplete the ranks but, it also counter intuitively motivates previously non-ideological individuals to join the ranks based on personal grievances. Therefore, the decision to conduct a targeted killing operation must discriminate targets and weigh the benefit of removing the threat with the risk of blowback from the community you are trying to protect. This type of consideration must be included when developing procedures to guide the proper implementation of a U.S. policy of targeted killing. The answer is not to stop
    targeted killings when they are justified, but to minimize mistakes with more timely and reliable intelligence and a careful process that reviews and approves all targeting missions.

    The argument between sovereignty vs. the right to self-defense often comes up when considering the legality of targeted killing. A state‟s inherent right to self-defense is established by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter which reads: "Nothing in present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self – defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self – defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."

    Unfortunately, much debate and controversy surround the ambiguity in what a legitimate self – defense response entails. The most accepted interpretation of this doctrine is based upon the necessity and proportionality test established in customary international law by the Caroline Doctrine. Proponents claim that under this doctrine states possess a right of anticipatory self – defense and that no armed attack need occur before a state may resort to force to counter a threat. If a nation is able to justify a targeted killing under Article 51 then it is legal in both international and domestic law. Emmanuel Gross provides four factors that are especially appropriate in determining the plausibility of a perceived threat:

    1. Past Practices: Past practices of the terrorist organization must be reviewed to determine the extent to which a possible attack is consistent with those practices.
    2. Motives: Does the group have particular goals? If so, then the extent to which those goals have or have not been fulfilled will bear on the likelihood of future attacks.
    3. Current Context: Have contemporary events cause tensions between the state and the terrorist to become exacerbated or relaxed? Similarly, what is the current state of relations between the target state and those sponsoring the terrorist group? Further, to what extent is the target state currently vulnerable from either a security or political perspective?
    4. Preparatory Actions: Even though no intelligence is available indicating a planned attack, are activities underway that suggest that an operation is being planned?...The more consistent the particular activities that the group conducts are with prior operations, the more likely a response is to be deemed necessary.

    These factors can assist a government in assessing conditions and identifying whether targeted killing is justified under the protection of Article 51 of the UN Charter.

    Weighing the risk of collateral damage vs. the benefit of removing a high value target must take into consideration proportionality and necessity. To present a realistic scenario, consider that a suspected “High Value” terrorist is discovered through intelligence information to be operating out of a house in a remote village outside of a northern Pakistani village. Three courses of action present themselves, (1) rely on the Pakistan government to resort to their only means of handling the situation, (2) use a hellfire missile mounted on a UAV platform to take out the target, (3) Do nothing, and let the known terrorist go free until the remote possibility of capture presents itself. Even though Michael Gross is not a supporter of targeted killing he acknowledges that, “assassination has the singular virtue of substantially reducing collateral damage and harm to noncombatants while eliminating grave, military threats.”

    The general consensus among early international law theorists and scholars was that an intentional attack to kill an enemy leader was typically permissible, provided the attack did not employ treacherous or perfidious means. Limitations designed to ensure legality and transparency must be established in order to ensure Targeted Killing Operations are not perceived as perfidious by the world community. Philip Alston, the Special Rapporteur for the United Nations, states in his report to the UN:

    Transparency and accountability in the context of armed conflict or other situations that raise security concerns may not be easy. States may have tactical or security reasons not to disclose criteria for selecting specific targets (e.g. public release of intelligence source information could cause harm to the source). But, without disclosure of the legal rationale as well as the bases for the selection of specific targets (consistent with genuine security needs), States are operating in an accountability vacuum. It is not possible for the international community to verify the legality of a killing, to confirm the authenticity or otherwise of intelligence relied upon, or to ensure that unlawful targeted killings do not result in impunity. The fact that there is no one-size-fits-all formula for such disclosure does not absolve States of the need to adopt explicit policies.

    The U.S. policy on targeted killing remains classified. However, publishing transparent guidelines (focusing on limitations) would provide some legal reassurance not only to the international community but, to the U.S. government employees that have been charged to conduct these crucial missions. In the paper, “The role of targeted killing in the campaign against terror,” COL Peter Cullen states, “The U.S. policy on targeted killing remains extremely controversial. It is a high risk, high payoff component in the campaign against terror. When successful, it eliminates key adversaries, disrupts terrorist planning, and highlights U.S. military prowess. When unsuccessful, however, it undermines U.S. credibility and severely strains relations with other nations.”

    The following proposed guidelines for Targeted Killing Operations should be implemented before congressional legislation removes this effective component from the armamentarium available in dealing with international terrorist:

    1. High Value Targets only.
    2. No Political Leadership.
    3. No Operations on U.S. soil.
    4. No Operations against U.S. citizens.
    5. Authorization from host nation.
    6. Option of last resort.
    7. Limit CIA involvement.
    8. Consider proportionality.
    9. High Level Approval.
    10. Congressional Oversight.

    Although it has been established that all members of al-Qaeda are combatants and would be legitimate targets, as stated earlier, targeted killing should be considered a high risk, high payoff asset. Limiting operations to key targets that pose a substantial threat to the U.S. would ease political strains with the international community. Mixed signals are given when political leadership is targeted as well. Focus should remain on combatants who take a direct role in planning, financing, or executing terrorist activities.

    Domestic Law should never be violated and conducting operations on U.S. citizens or on U.S. soil would inevitably contravene Federal Law. Also, in adherence to Article 2(4) of the UN charter all attempts should also be made to seek authorization from the state where the targeted individuals are located. In cases where combat operations are being conducted (e.g. Iraq or Afghanistan) then authorization with that government would not be possible or necessary.

    When the host country has a reliable and capable law enforcement element then all attempts to capture and interrogate the target should be made. Targeted killing should only occur when circumstances of capture are not a viable option or present an unreasonable risk to U.S. personnel. The operation to apprehend Somali warlord Mohammed Farrah Aidid in Mogadishu in 1993 illustrates some of the potential dangers inherent with the application of the law enforcement model within rogue states. Attempts to arrest a target in hostile territory could lead to an egregious level of collateral damage that may have been averted using targeted killing.

    The CIA plays a very important role in creating and maintaining the short list of individuals for targeted killing operations. The accuracy of this list is the key to success. However, CIA personnel are considered non-combatants on the battlefield and therefore the operations themselves should be executed only by military personnel. Again, proportionality must be a factor when conducting targeted killing. The ICRC states that, “the kind and degree of force which is permissible against persons not entitled to protection against direct attack must not exceed what is actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose in the prevailing circumstances.”

    Political considerations involving both impact and sensitivity demand that approval authority for these operations should only be given the highest levels of government. The U.S. system used today for Presidential findings for covert action would be ideal. The Presidential finding would be that the operation is a matter of necessity – the target poses a serious threat to the U.S. and that arrest is not a viable option – would have to be based upon clear and convincing evidence utilizing the most current intelligence available.

    Congressional oversight of how individuals are put on the list is required to maintain the support of the public. Understandably, it would be difficult to notify the congressional leadership prior to a targeted killing operation, however effort should be made to inform them immediately thereafter at a minimum. The first, most obvious reason is the inherent secrecy of the information involved in targeted killing operations. In other areas, such as the environment or banking, the media plays a valuable role in helping Congress monitor the actions of the federal government on behalf of the public. In the largely classified world of intelligence, in all but a few exceptional cases, the media is effectively precluded from playing that supporting role, thus enhancing the importance of legislative oversight.

    The 2002 National Security Strategy expanded the doctrine of pre-emptive self- defense.

    "Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer rely solely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today‟s threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries, choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first…"

    "We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today‟s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorist do not seek to attack us using conventional means…"

    "The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy‟s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively."

    This represented the most dynamic and controversial aspect of the National Security Strategy and what has since become known as the Bush Doctrine. This doctrine laid the foundation for the justification of targeted killing. In assessing the legality of these operations it is essential to determine whether or not an armed conflict exists between the U.S. and al-Qaeda. Regardless of the debate, since September 11th, the U.S. has clearly adopted the armed conflict model in its attempt to thwart this terrorist organization.

    In the pursuit of maintaining international legitimacy the U.S. must be more transparent in how it develops its policy regarding the specific targeting of suspected terrorist outside of the combat zones of Iraq and Afghanistan. Success or failure depends on the accuracy of the intelligence provided to conduct these operations. For targeted killing operations to succeed resources to improve identifying and locating high value targets must be allocated.

    When targeted killing operations are supported by a comprehensive information operations strategy and executed using accurate intelligence, it becomes a decisive weapon against international terrorism. Defining these operations as extra-judicial killings or assassinations is done so out of ignorance of the actual intent of the program. Again transparency is the key to this argument and assurances need to be provided that the above mentioned guidelines are being followed. Cullen states, “the U.S. must aggressively explain the strong legal and moral bases for the policy and assure the world community that the tactic is invoked sparingly and only when no other reasonable alternatives are available to prevent the target from threatening the U.S. and innocent civilians…public confidence in its checks and balances to ensure proper targeting decisions must be attained.

    Author's Note:
    This research paper was submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Diplomacy and Military Studies Degree at Hawaii Pacific University. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of Tactical Gamer.

    Editor's Note:
    McGann's highly annotated original work and be found at the following link.

    Comments 129 Comments
    1. E-Male's Avatar
      E-Male -
      "Targeted killing" is an excellent example of state propaganda redefining terms to make the action more publicly acceptable. In the 70s it was the Air Pollution index, now it is the Clean Air index.

      Target killing is a circumlocution for state-sponsored assassination. The same type of moral framework for foreign policy that launches an illegal war (the Bush Doctrine) pursues and executes individuals in the pursuit of ideological aims, then shifts the language as part of the public relations exercise.

      Your claim that state sponsored assassination "becomes a decisive weapon against international terrorism" is merely a repetition of the official narrative. There is little proof that the American-lead war on Terror (a terror itself) or the killing of OBL will have any decisive impact on terrorism.

      It is equally probable and valid to conclude that the actions of the USA have just given radical religious killers exactly what religions thrive on -- a martyr.

      The article does little more than repeat the state's narrative on the matter.

      As is usually the case, civilian casualties are swept under the rug, and we are asked to believe that increased reliance on assignation via drone (and similar methods) does not bread more hatred than it solves.

      This is not a matter of the state engaged in rational risk assessment, it is a matter of state-sponsored violence applied to ideological enemies (see Mark Douglas on the social construction of risk).

      Targeted killings are symptomatic of a failure of justice. The US state has demonstrated that it cannot be trusted to handle prisoners of war and those of lesser status who are swept up in its net (Guantanamo Bay) in any manner that approaches the standards of international law.

      It is highly unlikely that related actions, such as "targeted killing", will be handled with any greater ethical standard, efficiency, or effectiveness.

      When civilian casualties are included and properly accounted for, targeted killing is in fact state-sponsored targeted murder.

      Dr. Strangelove


      Do not assume that I am claiming OBL was innocent. The issue at hand is the ethical claims behind America's foreign policy, the claim that risk assessment by the state is a rational (and not ideological) process, and related claims about the value and efficacy of "targeted" killings that manage to kill many more civilians than targets. The ends are uncertain, yet this type of argument rests on the assumption that the end will be good and thus justifies the means.


      Also of interest is the phrase, the "crux of the debate whether targeted killing is legal and subsequently morally just". This appears to equate what is lawful with what is moral. I am not sure that this is what the author intends, but the notion that if it is lawful than it is morally just is a crude and highly flawed ethical argument. The law, as has been often noted, is an ass.
    1. MacLeod's Avatar
      MacLeod -
      E-Male is that avatar necessary?
    1. Ytman's Avatar
      Ytman -
      What differentiates assasination in war time to any other military action? War, justified or not, is the act of murdering another people. I accept what the US did with the assasination of OBL. I'd rather him be a martyr for a cause that has no lack of them then a person alive and kicking.

      The whole concept and fear of making people martyrs has me beffuddled. They have no lack of them in the middle east. What did Ghandi accomplish after being killed? Martin Luther King Jr.'s death considerably hurt the US' Civil Rights Movement and I rather would have him alive than a martyr; think of what would have happene if he were still with us!

      E-male likes to make counter statements alot don't mind the avatar.

      Air Pollution Index and Clean Air Index is just the age old question of the cup half filled. I'm a happy and optimistic person who likes to see the good things so I'll take Clean Air Index over Air Pollution Index even if its just a name."
    1. McGann's Avatar
      McGann -
      Oh E-Male, your reputation for being a Promoter of the Faith precedes you. So I would sooner choose to argue with a can of tomato soup than attempt to broaden your horizons with an intelligent discussion.

      @Ytman: Assassination during a time of war would still be considered illegal in most nations. A wartime Assassination would be killing of combatants using treacherous and or perfidious means (Soldiers outfitted in enemy uniforms used to gain trust to get close to a target would be an apt example of treacherous and perfidious means). I don't think OBL placed any trust or faith that we did not mean to cause him harm. Nor did the SEAL team that conducted the operation attempt entry into the compound by what anyone would consider treacherous means.
    1. sordavie's Avatar
      sordavie -
      I found the following sentence to be odd:

      The crux of the debate whether targeted killing is legal and subsequently morally just is based on...
      To my ear it sounds odd because it appears to conversationally imply that whether targeted killing is moral or not depends on whether it's legal or not. If that's so, it's a fairly implausible view you're putting forth.

      Although you appear mostly to be discussing the legal framework for such actions, you also hint at a discussion of the moral framework. Have you taken a look at any research in the field of ethics on the issue? It's too bad the government employs so many lawyers but so few philosophers.
    1. Sirusblk's Avatar
      Sirusblk -
      While it may have not been legal to kill OBL if it hadn't been handled the way it had it likely wouldn't have happened at all. This was a guy that was living in the Pakistan suburbs next to Pakistan's military base. Pakistan wasn't going to do anything about him. Regardless of all of this when it comes down to it I am much happier that he no longer exists, martyr or not.

      While I agree that the war on terror, handling of detainees, etc. has been poorly mismanaged I think the US was right on with the assassination of Bin Laden and I would have it no other way. We believe in the justice system of our individual countries and as much as we use the saying, "an eye for an eye leaves the whole world blind" our justice systems enforce that actions bear responsibility and are enforced through punishment. Legal method or not, morally guilty, morally dead.
    1. E-Male's Avatar
      E-Male -
      Quote Originally Posted by MacLeod View Post
      E-Male is that avatar necessary?
      No, I am simply making a point. In a few months or years OBL will be on tee shirts on American campuses, another 'anti-establishment' pop culture symbol like Che Guevara.

      He will remain a symbol, for better or worse. A symbol of multiple and contradictory meanings, radical-Islam-hate-mongering-terrorism and quite possibly a made-in-America symbol of Imperial overreach, blowback, and the hubris of Empire.

      Within less than a generation American teenagers may be wearing his image on their chest, along with Che Guevara, along with the rebel flag of the south . . .
    1. E-Male's Avatar
      E-Male -
      Quote Originally Posted by McGann View Post
      Oh E-Male, your reputation for being a Promoter of the Faith precedes you. So I would sooner choose to argue with a can of tomato soup than attempt to broaden your horizons with an intelligent discussion.
      So you prefer to simply stoop to insults?
    1. MacLeod's Avatar
      MacLeod -
      Quote Originally Posted by E-Male View Post

      Within less than a generation American teenagers may be wearing his image on their chest, along with Che Guevara, along with the rebel flag of the south . . .
      Well I live in TN so you can still find the confederate flag everywhere around here. Your other above statement about "anti-establishment pop culture" is highly unlikely to happen as Americans (including those who do not condone his death), even the minutely small portion that are anti-establishment, do not like OBL whatsoever and would not dream of using him as a symbol in a fight against the government. I am telling you right now that no one who has any respect at all for the Americans who lost their lives in 9/11 will ever wear OBL's face as a rallying icon against the government. There is a big difference between Guevara and OBL.
    1. E-Male's Avatar
      E-Male -
      "I am telling you right now that no one who has any respect at all for the Americans who lost their lives in 9/11 will ever wear OBL's face as a rallying icon against the government. There is a big difference between Guevara and OBL."

      Yes, there is a big difference between CG and OBL. Nonetheless, OBL's face is already appearing on tee shirts that celebrate his death (his image in my avatar is not a celebration of his life or what he stood for -- it is just his image).

      In a cultural context where we find some Americans burning their own flag, I suspect that it is only a matter of time until OBL becomes just another pop culture fixture, like my tee shirt that has a picture of Bart Simpson wearing a tee shirt that has Che on it.

      Consider this tee shirt:

      OBL as pop culture -- OBL as fashion and attitude statement. This is just 'inches' away from appearing on a tee shirt with a picture of Bart Simpson wearing a tee shirt that has a picture of OBL on it.

      I think you underestimate the degree to which commercial pop culture appropriates from all sources for all purposes, particularly transgressive purposes.

      I could be completely wrong here, but we shall see.
    1. MacLeod's Avatar
      MacLeod -
      The key words that I mentioned above are "a rallying icon against the government", some people do and will continue to wear his face on shirts but it is more of simple patriotic hubris then anything else, if anything the shirts will make fun of OBL like in the diagram above. The key difference about OBL is that no matter what happens, he will never become a symbol of anything good as Americans, even those who do not celebrate death, recognize that we are better off without him than with him. You will be hard pressed to find an American who wished that he were still alive.
    1. sordavie's Avatar
      sordavie -
      Yep, you're wrong. It's absurd to compare Osama with Che in this regard. Che for one didn't head an organization that perpetrated attacks against American civilians on American soil. Two, Che entered pop culture in a large part through the ideological support from prominent sections of the intellectual left and their influence on rebellious students of that era. That's definitely not so with Osama. Third, you have far more outlets for expression these days with the internet. It's far less of a commitment to post a lolcat jpeg making fun of Osama on your facebook page than to wear a shirt with his image on it. Commercial pop culture is driven by the consumers. It's not some independent thing with it's own mind coopting anything and everything for its own transgressive purposes.

      MacLeod, it's quite unlikely that shirts that either make fun of Osama or show patriotism will enter pop culture. Not sure why you think that.
    1. snooggums's Avatar
      snooggums -
      If there is an active military conflict, killing someone who is actively promoting enemy combat is similar to killing an artillery group. Spec ops destroying command centers or ammo supplies is similar to taking out Osama. There is no reason to treat a special ops mission in a foreign country to remove a specific enemy combatant to the arrest of someone by police officers.

      The real issue is the US unilaterally killing someone in another country with an apparent lack of approval. We wouldn't put up with that if Mexican authorities killed one of their drug lords on our land.
    1. E-Male's Avatar
      E-Male -
      Here is the very manifestation of my point, that pop culture will see the image of OBL used in a similar manner as Che G.:

      And here we see OBL used to critique the current American president:

      From the point of view of the semiotics of American (and global) pop culture, we see CG and OBL used in the same manner -- to critique the left and right wing within America or simply as in-your-face youthful rebellion, or as part of ironic commentary on pop culture itself.

      OBL and CG are already intermingled within the same semantic field of American pop culture.

      Whether or not it is "absurd to compare Osama with Che" is besides the point. The comparison has already been made within American pop culture.

      That speaks to a certain cultural logic at work within Empire.
    1. Skud's Avatar
      Skud -
      You're basing this entirely off what you've seen on the internet, aren't you?
    1. MacLeod's Avatar
      MacLeod -
      Quote Originally Posted by sordavie View Post
      MacLeod, it's quite unlikely that shirts that either make fun of Osama or show patriotism will enter pop culture. Not sure why you think that.
      I actually mentioned "some people" as the .01% that can be found wearing the shirt as a joke; I do not think it will ever become a wide trend.

      E-male, you continue to talk about youth rebellions and pop culture, could you clarify what you mean by those terms? You seem to believe that because one or two people have created signs or shirts and thrown the designs on the internet, that it means automatically that the entire culture of America's youth are doing the same - we do not walk around the streets with memebase internet jokes plastered to our chests. I do not know how it it working out atm up in Canada but 99% of America may not be as crazy as you think it is.
    1. E-Male's Avatar
      E-Male -
      Quote Originally Posted by MacLeod View Post
      ... it means automatically that the entire culture of America's youth are doing the same.
      Please, that is not what I claimed -- this is a fine example of overstating an opponent's position to make a 'straw man' out of the argument.

      We can have a reasonable conversation about the semiotics of American popular culture or we can reduce each other to gross caricatures.

      To clarify, I am suggesting the present and past of American pop culture implies the distinct possibility that OBL will operate within segments of pop culture in a similar manner as CG (and that manner was itself highly contradictory and took decades to develop).

      I am not really interested in arguing over the precise degree to which this is probable or the precise size of the market for such cultural icons. I cannot offer advice for investors interested in the size of tee-shirt futures within the marketplace . . .

      I am merely pointing out that the semiotic field which equates OBL and CG has already emerged within Internet. The Net has demonstrated its utility as a leading indicator of the direction of popular culture, so I am quite willing to place a wager on the probable relocation of OBL's image as yet another part of American pop culture -- a culture defined by transgression and one that is quite willing to lift a middle finger to the moral and political sensibilities of 'middle America'.
    1. SargeFry's Avatar
      SargeFry -
      How did we get from the ethics of a policy of assassination to T-Shirts again? TL;DR
    1. E-Male's Avatar
      E-Male -
      In Amerika, tee shirts are foreign policy . . .
    1. SargeFry's Avatar
      SargeFry -
      That DOES explain my "Boob Inspector" tee...
  • Connect

  • TeamSpeak 3 Server Info

  • Advertisement

  • Twitter Stream

  • Planetside 2 Outfit

  • Calendar

    October   2015
    Su Mo Tu We Th Fr Sa
    1 2 3
    4 5 6 7 8 9 10
    11 12 13 14 15 16 17
    18 19 20 21 22 23 24
    25 26 27 28 29 30 31

Back to top