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  • Inside the Meltdown

    Another great hour-long documentary on Frontline last night, this time on the Wall Street meltdown last year (and still happening this year). Regardless of whether or not this is America's next depression, it's a sad situation and one that deserves microscopic scrutiny.

    Frontline: "The Wall Street that we find in the summer of 2007 is very different than, let's say, the Wall Street -- "

    Alan "Ace" Greenberg, former CEO and Chairman of the Board at Bear Stearns: "There is no Wall Street. It's gone. There is no Wall Street. It's a street just like Broadway or Madison Avenue now. There are no firms on it. The model of the investment banking firm is gone forever. It will never come back, in my opinion. There are no investment banks."
    Mark Gertler, NYU Economist and close associate of Ben Bernanke:
    "Now, to be clear, the Fed can't eliminate recessions. There's a normal boom-bust cycle built in to the economy. The Fed's job is to moderate these cycles, and if you look at the period since 1984, the Fed had done a pretty good job in moderating the cycles.

    In my view, where things got out of hand is there was a failure to adjust the regulatory system. You could go along the way and say, look, if we had not permitted subprime lending, if we had not permitted these financial institutions that weren't banks to basically adopt portfolios like banks, holding mortgages and issuing short-term liabilities, we would not be in the mess we are today."
    Yes, there was a housing bubble. Yes, there was a mortgage market that exploited it by providing loans to Americans that could not afford to pay them. Yes, there were 'investment banks' that repackaged these mortgages and even leveraged tens of billions in credit default swaps on them. And there was a market and a global economy that reeled back on its heels. Most critical of all, though, the U.S. government failed to do its job on behalf of all of them - Greenspan and other leading 'hands-off' economists made a gross miscalculation.

    Watch and read on line:

    http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/meltdown/

    On a side note, it was astounding to me to watch politicians spout off their 'ideals' on the eve of an economic collapse - the debate surrounding the TARP legislation. It's documented proof positive of how dangerously ignorant some politicans are. Watch for yourself, and then look at what just occured on the floor of the federal legislature. Pure posturing. Not doing or acting in the nation's best interests, unwilling to depart from perceived principle without enough political risk. Thankfully Hank Paulson was not a politician, and was able to overcome his economic principles, set 'moral hazard' aside, and employ the sharpest regulatory tools available - hundreds of billions of federal capital. He very well may have prevented a complete collapse of the American economy.

  • #2
    Re: Inside the Meltdown

    http://www.huliq.com/1/77558/greensp...ationalization
    "It may be necessary to temporarily nationalize some banks in order to facilitate a swift and orderly restructuring," he said. "I understand that once in a hundred years this is what you do."
    http://www.npr.org/templates/story/s...oryId=95700786
    The American Bankers Association voiced its support for the emergency action on Tuesday.
    Nationalization of the banks is coming next!

    Then what? Full blown Socialism!

    The government will control what companies get loans, how you expand your business, if you don't participate in unions you will pay out the a$$.

    Comment


    • #3
      Re: Inside the Meltdown

      Am I the only one LOL'ing at the guy who says sub-prime lending was a failure of regulation?

      His comment that securitization increased systemic risk is also rather rich.

      So awesome. And the Fed is supposed to "moderate" the business cycle? These guys should do stand up.

      And yes, Mosely, I'm sure if the government would just spend more money none of this would have ever happened. *Cough cough*
      A policy of freedom for the individual is the only truly progressive policy. -F.A. Hayek

      "$250,000 a year won't get me to Central Park West."

      Comment


      • #4
        Re: Inside the Meltdown

        Originally posted by Nikolas View Post
        Am I the only one LOL'ing at the guy who says sub-prime lending was a failure of regulation?

        His comment that securitization increased systemic risk is also rather rich.

        So awesome. And the Fed is supposed to "moderate" the business cycle? These guys should do stand up.

        And yes, Mosely, I'm sure if the government would just spend more money none of this would have ever happened. *Cough cough*
        You seem to be extremely well informed on this subject.

        Explain to us why the type of security the story was talking about (based on bad sub-prime loans and resulting credit default swaps that others gambled huge amounts on that where then chopped up into complicated parts and doled out throughout the world with triple A credit ratings) didn't increase systemic risk.

        Also explain to us how lack of regulation (or even enforcement of regulatory policy on the books) did not lead to so many bad sub-prime loans?
        Iím not racists, I have republican friends. Radio show host.
        - "The essence of tyranny is the denial of complexity". -Jacob Burkhardt
        - "A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds" - Emerson
        - "People should not be afraid of it's government, government should be afraid of it's People." - Line from V for Vendetta
        - If software were as unreliable as economic theory, there wouldn't be a plane made of anything other than paper that could get off the ground. Jim Fawcette
        - "Let me now state what seems to me the decisive objection to any conservatism which deserves to be called such. It is that by its very nature it cannot offer an alternative to the direction in which we are moving." -Friedrich Hayek
        - "Don't waist your time on me your already the voice inside my head." Blink 182 to my wife

        Comment


        • #5
          Re: Inside the Meltdown

          Originally posted by Nikolas View Post
          And yes, Mosely, I'm sure if the government would just spend more money none of this would have ever happened. *Cough cough*
          That's not at all what I said, and in fact regulation doesn't require much money at all. The 'Greenspan put' actually didn't require money either, and is only one of many regulatory tools traditionally used by the Federal reserve. Other tools include open book requirements, limits on sub-prime lending, restrictions on practices like the repackaging of debt and credit default swaps. Free-market principle prevented the use of some of these tools, not simply because of cost. The result, as we are now witnessing, is several magnitudes more expensive if you total up the bailouts, buyouts, 'stimulus,' lost taxes and lost GDP.

          Do those of you crying socialism realize who Henry Paulson is? He is one of the last men in America who would ever want to bail out a bank or any other private company. Only when you start to know who he is do you begin to understand the immense gravity (generally referred to as contagion) that caused him and other regulatory conservatives to painfully throw moral hazard to the wind. This documentary covers that quite well, I thought.

          Comment


          • #6
            Re: Inside the Meltdown

            Originally posted by AMosely View Post
            The 'Greenspan put' actually didn't require money either, and is only one of many regulatory tools traditionally used by the Federal reserve.
            It requires an absolutely immense amount of money. So much, in fact, that its deployment radically devalues all currency in circulation. Enough money to make the "stimulus bill" look like peanuts.

            Do those of you crying socialism realize who Henry Paulson is? He is one of the last men in America who would ever want to bail out a bank or any other private company. Only when you start to know who he is do you begin to understand the immense gravity (generally referred to as contagion) that caused him and other regulatory conservatives to painfully throw moral hazard to the wind. This documentary covers that quite well, I thought.
            The documentary totally misses the whole point of the Bush era bailouts: Not to bailout the banks themselves, but rather the debtholders. People like, you know, Goldman Sachs. People that Hank might go golfing with on weekends. These folks took zero loss, their entire potential loss being absorbed by the government.

            Goldman et al are the modern standard bearers of corporatism. They hide behind a free market facade when the people in power want to harm them, and embrace intervention when it suits them. It's the smart thing to do. Why should we expect the people who come from these institutions, such as ole Hank, to behave any differently?
            Last edited by Nikolas; 02-18-2009, 10:35 PM.
            A policy of freedom for the individual is the only truly progressive policy. -F.A. Hayek

            "$250,000 a year won't get me to Central Park West."

            Comment


            • #7
              Re: Inside the Meltdown

              Originally posted by El_Gringo_Grande View Post
              Explain to us why the type of security the story was talking about (based on bad sub-prime loans and resulting credit default swaps that others gambled huge amounts on that where then chopped up into complicated parts and doled out throughout the world with triple A credit ratings) didn't increase systemic risk.
              Simple version:

              A bunch of mortgages plopped together is an MBS (mortgage backed security).

              An MBS is sliced into tranches to create CDOs (collateralized debt obligations).

              CDOs can be insured with CDSs (credit default swaps).


              CDOs decrease risk by providing low risk returns to those who want it, high risk returns to others who want that, and spreading risk thinly throughout the system by selling the instruments to many many different parties. One problem, of course, was the lack of securitization which existed when many IBanks didn't offload CDOs. They held onto them. By concentrating the CDOs into one spot, it was as if the securitization had never happened - many CDOs were created and then held onto by the originator! That's the opposite of securitization.
              Last edited by Nikolas; 02-18-2009, 06:35 PM.
              A policy of freedom for the individual is the only truly progressive policy. -F.A. Hayek

              "$250,000 a year won't get me to Central Park West."

              Comment


              • #8
                Re: Inside the Meltdown

                The most damning fact for the pro-regulation crowd would be the absolute non-existence of people clamoring, ten years ago, for fewer home loans to poor people. I've heard people say that poor people shouldn't get credit cards. Or payday loans. Or "predatory loans." (All suggestions would of course harm poor people, true, but at least these statements have been made by the misinformed for years). But I don't recall many pre-bubble folks saying that poor people or people with bad credit should be kept from buying houses. In fact, as I recall, it was quite the opposite! Wasn't the story that banks don't like to lend to insert minority here? Wasn't regulation bandied about as a possible fix, to get banks lending more to these poor folks?

                We libertarians, however, have a rather convenient cover story from a prominent European newspaper, neigh ten years ago, warning of the looming potential disaster wrought by decades of government meddling. PDF warning: here

                And the Austrian School has their own Nobel Laureate, whom contributed greatly to the following theory, and which was developed several decades ago:

                The theory views most business cycles as the inevitable consequence of inherently damaging and ineffective central bank policies, which cause interest rates to remain too low for too long, resulting in excessive credit creation, speculative economic bubbles and lowered savings.[1]

                According to [The Austrian Business Cycle Theory], the business cycle unfolds in the following way. Low interest rates tend to stimulate borrowing from the banking system. This expansion of credit causes an expansion of the supply of money, through the money creation process in a fractional reserve banking system. This in turn leads to an unsustainable "monetary boom" during which the "artificially stimulated" borrowing seeks out diminishing investment opportunities. This boom results in widespread malinvestments, causing capital resources to be misallocated into areas that would not attract investment if the money supply remained stable. A correction or "credit crunch" – commonly called a "recession" or "bust" – occurs when credit creation cannot be sustained. Then the money supply suddenly and sharply contracts when markets finally "clear", causing resources to be reallocated back towards more efficient uses. The main proponents of the Austrian business cycle theory historically were Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek, both of whom predicted the Great Depression. F.A. Hayek won the Nobel Prize in economics in 1974 based on his elaborations on this theory.

                Hayek's formulation of the theory was harshly criticised by John Maynard Keynes, Piero Sraffa and Nicholas Kaldor when he first advanced it in the 1930s. Mainstream economists like Milton Friedman,[3][4] Gordon Tullock,[5] Bryan Caplan,[6] and Paul Krugman[7] have stated that they regard the theory as incorrect. David Laidler views the theory as motivated to some extent by the political leanings of its major proponents, as Austrian economists are known for their strong opposition to government involvement in the economy, and argues that the theory was to some extent discredited because of its association with "nihilistic policy prescriptions" for the Great Depression. On the other hand, he did also state that its core insights were materially worthwhile, especially as they relate to the work of Dennis Robertson.[8] In addition, William White believes that the Austrian explanation of the business cycle might be relevant once again in an environment of excessively low interest rates. According to the theory, a sustained period of low interest rates and excessive credit creation results in a volatile and unstable imbalance between saving and investment.[9][10]
                Last edited by Nikolas; 02-18-2009, 09:28 PM.
                A policy of freedom for the individual is the only truly progressive policy. -F.A. Hayek

                "$250,000 a year won't get me to Central Park West."

                Comment


                • #9
                  Re: Inside the Meltdown

                  Originally posted by Nikolas View Post
                  Simple version:

                  A bunch of mortgages plopped together is an MBS (mortgage backed security).

                  An MBS is sliced into tranches to create CDOs (collateralized debt obligations).

                  CDOs can be insured with CDSs (credit default swaps).


                  CDOs decrease risk by providing low risk returns to those who want it, high risk returns to others who want that, and spreading risk thinly throughout the system by selling the instruments to many many different parties. One problem, of course, was the lack of securitization which existed when many IBanks didn't offload CDOs. They held onto them. By concentrating the CDOs into one spot, it was as if the securitization had never happened - many CDOs were created and then held onto by the originator! That's the opposite of securitization.

                  Good explaination Tybalt/nikolas, but you missed one aspect.

                  The reason the companies held onto these CDO's is because nobody wanted them, so therefore they held no real value. The real problem occured when they were marked on their balance sheets as being worth billions of dollars when they really could have been worth nothing. It is quite possible the SECOND these CDO's were placed on the Ibanks balance sheets, the companies were insolvent because the true value of their assets might have been less then the true value of their liabilities. Everyone in that line of business knew there was a whopper of a lie being told on those balance sheets, but everyone winked and smiled and ignored it because as long as the credit markets didnt dry up, the lie wouldn't matter. There is simply no possible way the CEO's and CFO didn't know there was a lie being told, hell, they were the ones telling it! You don't get to be a CEO or CFO of a multi-billion dollar company by being stupid, you know? All it took was one company being antsy about the obvious lie being told on the balance sheets, and for them to cut off credit to one of the liars for the cascade to begin.

                  The only place regulation really falls into this situation is that Ibanks used to have to be privately held companies and the Ibank and Dbank industries were kept at arms length. You are going to be a lot more wary of risk when it is your own personal fortune at risk along with your investors. Fast forward to today where a lot of Ibanks own Dbanks, and most Ibanks are now publicly traded companies, so therefore the people in charge have no real stake in the long term health of the company because with a few exceptions, this is a short-term business in upper management. How many years do you need to make 40-60 million a year before you work for the enjoyment more then the money? (god I would love to do some first-hand research on that topic!)

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Re: Inside the Meltdown

                    Originally posted by Nikolas View Post
                    Simple version:

                    A bunch of mortgages plopped together is an MBS (mortgage backed security).

                    An MBS is sliced into tranches to create CDOs (collateralized debt obligations).

                    CDOs can be insured with CDSs (credit default swaps).


                    CDOs decrease risk by providing low risk returns to those who want it, high risk returns to others who want that, and spreading risk thinly throughout the system by selling the instruments to many many different parties. One problem, of course, was the lack of securitization which existed when many IBanks didn't offload CDOs. They held onto them. By concentrating the CDOs into one spot, it was as if the securitization had never happened - many CDOs were created and then held onto by the originator! That's the opposite of securitization.
                    What Morganan said.

                    If they where regulated better and if they had the assets to back them up it would have decreased the risk.

                    Problem is they where not regulated, or the regulation was not enforced, and there wasn't, in many cases, assets to back them up. The only "asset" was the belief that the value of the properties could only go up.

                    Because of this and the fact everybody THOUGHT they where well regulated/back up by assets and bogus credit ratings systemic risk was huge.


                    Originally posted by Nikolas View Post
                    The most damning fact for the pro-regulation crowd would be the absolute non-existence of people clamoring, ten years ago, for fewer home loans to poor people.
                    You make no sense. That regulation wasn't in place or not inforced is a "damning fact" against those for regulation?

                    Wha?

                    Please go back and do some more research and put more thought into your posts. I think you are on the verge of having a valid point. You may not even realize this but you are close. (In the end you are still wrong.)
                    Iím not racists, I have republican friends. Radio show host.
                    - "The essence of tyranny is the denial of complexity". -Jacob Burkhardt
                    - "A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds" - Emerson
                    - "People should not be afraid of it's government, government should be afraid of it's People." - Line from V for Vendetta
                    - If software were as unreliable as economic theory, there wouldn't be a plane made of anything other than paper that could get off the ground. Jim Fawcette
                    - "Let me now state what seems to me the decisive objection to any conservatism which deserves to be called such. It is that by its very nature it cannot offer an alternative to the direction in which we are moving." -Friedrich Hayek
                    - "Don't waist your time on me your already the voice inside my head." Blink 182 to my wife

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Re: Inside the Meltdown

                      Marganan,

                      1) The CDOs were created by the IBanks. They bought mortgages or MBS and turned them into CDOs. If some CDOs were instant drains on the IBank's balance sheets, that simply means that the IBanks screwed up and overpaid for the underlying mortgages or MBS. Those poor, uninformed IBankers! Taken advantage of!

                      2) Whether a company is publicly traded or privately owned does not have a direct impact on executive compensation and incentives. There is no reason executive compensation need be any different one way or the other. The dilemma - getting a manager to run a company in line with the interests of the shareholders - is present and indeed is identical whether the company is private or public. Bear Stearns, in fact, had very significant employee ownership, and indeed one of the largest shareholders was the executive! And yet they were the first one to fall.

                      2a) Regardless, I don't believe that regulators have yet come up with the wonderful cure-all to employee incentives. If they do come up with something that works magic, they wouldn't need to regulate it's use, since shareholders and their boards would be insane not to adopt it. Employee incentives are constantly being tweaked and researched. The problems inherent in the latest iteration of exec incentives are of course well known. And the next iteration of incentives will have their own problems.
                      Last edited by Nikolas; 02-20-2009, 12:41 PM.
                      A policy of freedom for the individual is the only truly progressive policy. -F.A. Hayek

                      "$250,000 a year won't get me to Central Park West."

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Re: Inside the Meltdown

                        Gringo,

                        If no one was clamoring for fewer home loans to the poor, then it's quite a stretch to suggest that regulation would have foreseen the problems which home loans to poor people wrought. See, to make the claim that regulation would have fixed it, you have to show me the people clamoring for said regulation before the crisis. You can't come in, after the crisis, and say X and Y regulations would have prevented 1 and 2. You must say that before the problems emerge.

                        The fact that most all housing related regulation - even today! - seeks to increase home ownership, and to increase housing prices... well that's yet more damning evidence that regulation exacerbated the problems in that sector.

                        As a counterexample, you can look at the newspaper cover I linked to a couple posts ago. It's from nine years ago, and shows how some people - starting with Austrian economists, but spreading outward - were concerned that the government's regulation was encouraging excess risk taking. This is further explained in Rincewind's video from his newly posted thread. By keeping interest rates artificially low, folks way back then said that the Fed was driving people from Treasuries and into more risky things (like "safe" mortgages), all the while making seed money too cheap for the banks. Regulation encouraging risk.
                        Last edited by Nikolas; 02-20-2009, 12:54 PM.
                        A policy of freedom for the individual is the only truly progressive policy. -F.A. Hayek

                        "$250,000 a year won't get me to Central Park West."

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Re: Inside the Meltdown

                          Originally posted by Nikolas View Post
                          Gringo,

                          If no one was clamoring for fewer home loans to the poor, then it's quite a stretch to suggest that regulation would have foreseen the problems which home loans to poor people wrought. See, to make the claim that regulation would have fixed it, you have to show me the people clamoring for said regulation before the crisis. You can't come in, after the crisis, and say X and Y regulations would have prevented 1 and 2. You must say that before the problems emerge.

                          The fact that most all housing related regulation - even today! - seeks to increase home ownership, and to increase housing prices... well that's yet more damning evidence that regulation exacerbated the problems in that sector.
                          That is absolutely horrible logic and I don't know how you can come to any conclusion with your thinking. You are twisting yourself up and not making any sense.

                          Originally posted by Nikolas View Post
                          As a counterexample, you can look at the newspaper cover I linked to a couple posts ago. It's from nine years ago, and shows how some people - starting with Austrian economists, but spreading outward - were concerned that the government's regulation was encouraging excess risk taking. This is further explained in Rincewind's video from his newly posted thread. By keeping interest rates artificially low, folks way back then said that the Fed was driving people from Treasuries and into more risky things (like "safe" mortgages), all the while making seed money too cheap for the banks. Regulation encouraging risk.
                          You're arguments are actually against the mixture of deregulation and bad regulation that took place to create the perfect storm. Not against regulation.

                          The bad regulation did happen. Like you pointed out the rates where kept low to keep the economy looking stronger than it was. Rules encouraged the selling of too much home to too many risky prospects. (Actually the rules didn't encourage the bad loans. Certain people did using a fairly straightforward and useful law to help those on the fringes of the credit system and those in neighborhoods singled out back in the days of racism as un-creditworthy. They used for their own political and financial gain and in the end screwed everybody, including those the law was intended to help.)

                          At the same time the deregulation of parts of the financial systems allowed, in effect, bad mortgage laundering. Hiding all those bad mortgages allowed even more bad mortgages to be sold because the earlier mistakes/cheats where hidden.

                          Maybe that was the point you where trying to get to?

                          It is my opinion that the bad regulation, on it's own, would have caused a small real estate bubble in a few markets and minor recession.

                          The deregulation and complete disregard for common sense financial thinking caused the crisis.
                          Iím not racists, I have republican friends. Radio show host.
                          - "The essence of tyranny is the denial of complexity". -Jacob Burkhardt
                          - "A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds" - Emerson
                          - "People should not be afraid of it's government, government should be afraid of it's People." - Line from V for Vendetta
                          - If software were as unreliable as economic theory, there wouldn't be a plane made of anything other than paper that could get off the ground. Jim Fawcette
                          - "Let me now state what seems to me the decisive objection to any conservatism which deserves to be called such. It is that by its very nature it cannot offer an alternative to the direction in which we are moving." -Friedrich Hayek
                          - "Don't waist your time on me your already the voice inside my head." Blink 182 to my wife

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            Re: Inside the Meltdown

                            Originally posted by El_Gringo_Grande View Post
                            It is my opinion that the bad regulation, on it's own, would have caused a small real estate bubble in a few markets and minor recession.
                            So you do, at least, admit that not all regulation is "good" regulation. The financial sector had a significant amount of regulation pre-crisis that was, as you put it, "bad regulation". We may disagree on exactly how bad the consequences from that were, but we agree on the principle.

                            That should lead us to be wary of calls today to fix the industry by simply adding more regulation. If the new regulations added are just as bad as the old ones, we haven't improved anything at all. What we need to do is identify and prune the bad regulations and replace them with good regulations. But that's not what Congress is doing...

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              Re: Inside the Meltdown

                              I'm not really disagreeing with any of your premises here.

                              Originally posted by Nikolas View Post
                              Marganan,

                              1) The CDOs were created by the IBanks. They bought mortgages or MBS and turned them into CDOs. If some CDOs were instant drains on the IBank's balance sheets, that simply means that the IBanks screwed up and overpaid for the underlying mortgages or MBS. Those poor, uninformed IBankers! Taken advantage of!
                              They were the ones taking advantage of the situation, not vice versia, cmon, you know that. :)

                              2) Whether a company is publicly traded or privately owned does not have a direct impact on executive compensation and incentives. There is no reason executive compensation need be any different one way or the other. The dilemma - getting a manager to run a company in line with the interests of the shareholders - is present and indeed is identical whether the company is private or public. Bear Stearns, in fact, had very significant employee ownership, and indeed one of the largest shareholders was the executive! And yet they were the first one to fall.
                              You are kind of missing the point here. In times gone past, when ibanks were not allowed to own dbanks and they were not allowed to be public companies, one singular person essentially "owned" the company. If the company made bad decisions and went belly-up, that owner would be found sleeping under the bicycle bridge in central park as he lost his own personal fortune. When you hit the card table and are playing with my money, you wont asses risk in the same fashion if you were playing with your mortgage payment, and your car payment, and your living expenses. What was the CEO's stake in bear sterns? 10-15%? Back to the card table example, if you sit down at the table with $1000 of which only $100 is yours, and you dont have to pay back the other 900, we both know the risk to you isn't the same as if thjat $1000 was all your money. How many years does it take to recoup a 10% stake collecting bonuses and salary and stock options?

                              2a) Regardless, I don't believe that regulators have yet come up with the wonderful cure-all to employee incentives. If they do come up with something that works magic, they wouldn't need to regulate it's use, since shareholders and their boards would be insane not to adopt it. Employee incentives are constantly being tweaked and researched. The problems inherent in the latest iteration of exec incentives are of course well known. And the next iteration of incentives will have their own problems.
                              Im not versed enough on this topic to get into a fully detailed discussion with you about this, and I cant honestly dispute your points as for the most part I agree with them. I'd personally just be happy if investment banks had to be privately owned entities again, and they were kept out of the deposit banking market. Why should we be able to keep our assets when the company we directed went belly-up due to our bad decisions? We stand the gain the biggest reward from good business decisions, why shouldn't we take the biggest risks and invest our own personal fortune to play that game?

                              Comment

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